An optimal control problem is considered for a stochastic differential equation with the cost functional determined by a backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short). This kind of cost functional can cover the general discounting (including exponential and non-exponential) situation with a recursive feature. It is known that such a problem is time-inconsistent in general. Therefore, instead of finding a global optimal control, we look for a time-consistent locally near optimal equilibrium strategy. With the idea of multi-person differential games, a family of approximate equilibrium strategies is constructed associated with partitions of the time intervals. By sending the mesh size of the time interval partition to zero, an equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB, for short) equation is derived, through which the equilibrium valued function and an equilibrium strategy are obtained. Under certain conditions, a verification theorem is proved and the well-posedness of the equilibrium HJB is established. As a sort of Feynman-Kac formula for the equilibrium HJB equation, a new class of BSVIEs (containing the diagonal value Z(r, r) of Z(· , ·)) is naturally introduced and the well-posedness of such kind of equations is briefly presented.
Introduction
Let (Ω, F , P) be a complete probability space on which a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion W = {W (t); 0 t < ∞} is defined, and let F = {F t } t 0 be the natural filtration of W (·) augmented by all the P-null sets in F . Let T > 0. We denote
(t, s) 0 t s T .
(1.1)
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, consider the following controlled (forward) stochastic differential equation (SDE, or FSDE, for short) on the finite horizon [t, T ], in its integral form: We refer the readers to [11, 13, 43] for more details. It is easy to see that Y (·) solves (1.5) if and only if for some Z(·), the pair (Y (·), Z(·)) is an adapted solution to the following backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short):
Y (s) = h(X(T )) + (ii) Heterogeneous discounting: µ(t, T ) = e −λ1(T −t) , ν(t, r) = e −λ2(r−t) with λ 1 , λ 2 > 0, λ 1 = λ 2 ;
(iii) Convex combination of two exponential discounting : µ(t, T ) = αe −λ1(T −t) + (1 − α)e −λ2(T −t) , ν(t, r) = αe −λ1(r−t) + (1 − α)e −λ2(r−t) , with α ∈ (0, 1), λ 1 , λ 2 > 0, λ 1 = λ 2 ;
(iv) Quasi-exponential discounting: µ(t, T ) = 1 + α(T − t) e −λ(T −t) , ν(t, r) = 1 + α(r − t) e −λ(r−t) , with α, λ > 0.
We refer the reader to [14, 16, 15, 26, 27] for some relevant results. Inspired by [46, 47, 48, 43] , instead of (1.10), one may consider the following more general cost functional J(t, ξ; u(·)) = E t h(t, X(T )) + T t g(t, r, X(r), u(r))dr , (1.11) which not only includes the cases with the discounting functions (i)-(iv) listed above, but also, of course, includes the case of exponential discounting. It turns out that the optimal control problem with the state equation (1.2) and the above cost functional J(t, ξ; u(·)) is time-inconsistent, in general. If we let Y (s) = E s h(s, X(T )) + T s g(s, r, X(r), u(r))dr , s ∈ [t, T ], (1.12) then for some Z(· , ·), the pair ( Y (·), Z(· , ·)) is the adapted solution to the following backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short): and J(t, ξ; u(·)) = Y (t).
Motivated by the above non-exponential discounting, together with the recursive utility/disutility, it is then natural to introduce the following recursive cost functional with general (nonexponential) discounting:
Y (s) = h(s, X(T )) + In (1.14) , g(·) and h(·) are called the generator and the free term, respectively, of the BSVIE. By the standard results of BSVIE (see, [45, 34] ), under some mild conditions, for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, any control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], and the corresponding state process X(·), equation (1.14) admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) ≡ (Y ( · ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(· , · ; t, ξ, u(·))), by which we mean an (R × R 1×d )-valued random field (Y, Z) = {(Y (s), Z(s, r)) : (s, r) ∈ ∆[t, T ]} such that Y (·) is F-progressively measurable on [t, T ]; for each fixed s ∈ [t, T ], Z(s, ·) is F-progressively measurable on [s, T ]; equation (1.14) is satisfied in the usual Itô sense. Now, with the adapted solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) of BSVIE (1.14) , depending on (t, ξ, u(·)), we introduce the following cost functional:
J(t, ξ; u(·)) = Y (t). (1.15) Thus, we are considering state equation (1.2) with the recursive cost functional (1.15) determined through BSVIE (1.14) . Then the corresponding optimal control problem can be stated as:
Problem (N). For each (t, ξ) ∈ D, find aū(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that J(t, ξ;ū(·)) = essinf u(·)∈U [t,T ] J(t, ξ; u(·)) = V (t, ξ). (1.16) Similar to before, anyū(·) ∈ U [t, T ] satisfying (1.16) is called an (open-loop) optimal control of Problem (N) for the initial pair (t, ξ); the corresponding state processX(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ,ū(·)) is called an (open-loop) optimal state process; (X(·),ū(·)) is called an (open-loop) optimal pair; and V (·, ·) is called the value function of Problem (N).
We point out that Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, in general. Readers might notice that in [46, 43] , a similar problem was studied, where the (recursive) cost functional was described by a family of BSDEs. In the last section, we will briefly present an argument to show that using BSVIEs seems to be more natural than using BSDEs. Because of the time-inconsistency of the above Problem (N), people also refer to the above optimal controlū(·) as the pre-commitment optimal control.
Let us take this opportunity to briefly recall the history of BSVIEs. As an extension of BSDEs, a BSVIE of form (where Y (·) could be higher dimensional) was firstly studied by Lin [23] , followed by several other researchers: Aman and N'Zi [2] , Wang and Zhang [42] , Djordjević and Janković [9, 10] , Hu and Øksendal [17] , etc. Inspired by the study of optimal control problems for forward stochastic Volterra integral equations (FSVIEs, for short), Yong [45] introduced more general BSVIEs, together with the notion of adapted M-solution. There are quite a few follow-up works. Let us mention some: Anh-Grecksch-Yong [3] investigated BSVIEs in Hilbert spaces; Shi-Wang-Yong [33] studied the well-posedness of BSVIEs containing expectation (of the unknowns); Ren [32] discussed BSVIEs with jumps; Wang-Sun-Yong [36] studied BSVIE with quadratic growth (in Z); Wang-Yong [40] obtained a representation of the adapted (M-)solution for a class of BSVIEs via the so-called representation partial differential equations; Overbeck and Röder [29] even developed a theory of path-dependent BSVIEs; Numerical aspect was considered by Bender-Pokalyuk [4] ; relevant optimal control problems were studied by Shi-Wang-Yong [34] , Agram-Øksendal [1] , Wang-Zhang [41] , and Wang [38] ; Wang-Yong [39] established various comparison theorems for both adapted solutions and adapted M-solutions to BSVIEs in multi-dimensional Euclidean spaces.
For the state equation (1.2) together with the recursive cost functional J(t, ξ; u(·)) defined by (1.15) through the BSVIE (1.14), Problem (N) is expected to be time-inconsistent. Therefore, finding an optimal control at any given initial pair (t, ξ) is not very useful. Instead, one should find an equilibrium strategy which is time-consistent and possesses certain kind of local optimality. To find such a strategy, we adopt the method of multi-person differential games. The idea can be at least traced back to the work of Pollak [31] in 1968. Later, the approach was adopted and further developed by Ekeland-Lazrak [14, 15] ; Yong [46, 47, 48] ; Björk-Murgoci [6] ; Björk-Murgoci-Zhou [7] ; Björk-Khapko-Murgoci [5] ; Wei-Yong-Yu [43] , Mei-Yong [28] , and Yan-Yong [44] for various kinds of problems.
Let us now recall the approach of [46] , which leads to our current approach. For any τ ∈ [0, T ), we first divide the time interval [τ, T ] into N subintervals:
and introduce an N -person differential game, where players are labeled from 1 to N . Player k takes over the system at t = t k−1 from Player (k − 1), controls the system on [t k−1 , t k ), and hands over to Player (k + 1). The initial pair (t k−1 , X(t k−1 )) of Player k is the terminal pair of Player (k − 1). All the players know that each player tries to find an optimal control (in some sense) for his/her own problem and each player will discount the future cost in his/her own way, even though this player is not controlling the system later on. For Player k, using the representation of adapted solutions to the BSVIE by that of FSDE, together with a presentation partial differential equation, the future cost on [t k , T ] will be transformed to the terminal cost at t = t k ; and with some suitable modification of BSVIE on [t k−1 , t k ], a suitable recursive cost functional on [t k−1 , t k ] for Player k can be constructed. Then Player k faces a time-consistent optimal control problem. Under proper conditions, an optimal control on [t k−1 , t k ] can be determined. This leads to an approximate equilibrium strategy and the corresponding approximate equilibrium value function of the game. Letting the mesh size Π tend to zero, we get the limits called the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium value function of the original problem, respectively. At the same time, a so-called equilibrium Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (equilibrium HJB equation, for short) is also derived, which can be used to identify the time-consistent equilibrium value function. Under certain conditions, the equilibrium strategy is locally optimal in a proper sense. When σ(·) is independent of the control process u(·), under some mild conditions, we will show that the equilibrium HJB equation admits a unique classical solution. Furthermore, inspired by the idea of decoupling FBSDEs and the nonlinear Feynman-Kac formula, the (classical) solution of the equilibrium HJB equation can be represented by the solution of a new type BSVIE in which the term Z(s, s) appears. Under certain conditions, a wellposedness result of such an equation is established. As a consequence, the equilibrium strategy can be expressed in terms of the solution to such a BSVIE.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present preliminary results which will be useful in the sequel. In Section 3, by using the idea of multi-person differential games, a family of approximate equilibrium strategies is constructed. By letting the mesh size tend to zero, the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium value function are determined by the equilibrium HJB equation. A verification theorem as well as a well-posedness result of the equilibrium HJB equation (for a special case) is obtained in Section 4. In Section 5, a new kind of BSVIE (containing the diagonal values Z(s, s) of Z(· , ·)) is introduced, which is motivated by finding a Feynman-Kac type formula for the equilibrium HJB equation. Some concluding remarks are collected in Section 6, including a formal argument to show that BSVIE is a more suitable way to represent a recursive cost functional with nonexponential discounting, a comparison of equilibrium HJB equations resulted from two approaches, and some open questions concerning Problem (N).
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, M ⊤ stands for the transpose of a matrix M , tr (M ) the trace of M , R n×d the Euclidean space consisting of (n × d) real matrices, endowed with the Frobenius inner product M, N → tr [M ⊤ N ]. Let U ⊆ R m be a nonempty set which could be bounded or unbounded and S n be the subspace of R n×n consisting of symmetric matrices. We will use K > 0 to represent a generic constant which could be different from line to line. Let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon and H (also H 1 , H 2 ) be a Euclidean space (which could be R n , R n×d , S n , etc.). Recall ∆[0, T ] = (t, s) ∈ [0, T ] 2 | 0 t s T as before. In the sequel, we will need various spaces of functions and processes, which we collect here first for convenience:
is j-th continuously differentiable for any 0 j k ,
, the j-th derivatives are bounded, 0 j k .
For convenience, we rewrite the state equation and the recursive cost functional below:
and
To guarantee the well-posedness of the controlled SDE (2.1) and BSVIE (2.2), we adopt the following assumptions:
There exists a constant L > 0 such that
The following results, whose proofs are standard (see [50] and [45, 34] ), present the well-posedness of SDE (2.1) and BSVIE (2.2) under (H1)-(H2). Lemma 2.1. Let (H1) hold. Then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], the state equation (2.1) admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, ξ, u(·)) ∈ L 2 F (Ω; C([t, T ]; R n )). Moreover, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ) and u(·), such that
In addition, if (H2) also holds, then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D, control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], and the corresponding state process X(·), BSVIE (2.2) admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) ≡ (Y (· ; t, ξ, u(·)), Z(·, · ; t, ξ, u(·))) ∈ C([t, T ];
Moreover, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ) and u(·), such that
We now present a result concerning a certain type modified BSVIEs, which will play a crucial role in our subsequent analysis. For any (t, ξ) ∈ D and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], let (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)) be the adapted solution to (2.1)-(2.2). For any small ε > 0, consider the following BSVIE:
Y ε (s) = h ε (s, X(T )) + This is a natural approximation of the original BSVIE (2.2), in which the generator and the free term have been modified for s ∈ [t, t + ε] only. By Lemma 2.1, under (H1)-(H2), BSVIE (2.6) admits a unique adapted solution (Y ε (·), Z ε (·, ·)). By the stability of adapted solutions to BSVIEs, we have sup
hereafter K > 0 is a generic constant which could be different from line to line. In particular,
In our later discussion, we will need a little better than the above. Thus, some more delicate analysis is needed. We now present the following result which gives a representation of (Y ε (·), Z ε (· , ·)) in terms of (X(·), Y (·), Z(·, ·)) and a better estimate than (2.8).
T ], and (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)) be the adapted solution of (2.1)-(2.2). For ε ∈ (0, T − t], let (Y ε (·), Z ε (· , ·)) be the adapted solution of (2.6). with ( Y (·), Z(·)) being the adapted solution of the following BSDE:
(2.11)
Moreover, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)), such that
Proof. First of all, for s ∈ [t + ε, T ], BSVIEs (2.6) and (2.2) are identical. Thus, by the uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSVIEs, we have (2.9). Next, for the given (X(·), u(·)), we denote (suppressing X(·) and u(·), for notational simplicity) h(s) = h(s, X(T )), g(s, r, y, z) = g(s, r, X(r), u(r), y, z), h ε (s) = h ε (s, X(T )), g ε (s, r, y, z) = g ε (s, r, X(r), u(r), y, z).
To get (2.10), we let (y(s, ·), z(s, ·)) and (y ε (s, ·), z ε (s, ·)) be the adapted solutions to the following BSDEs parameterized by s ∈ [t, T ], respectively: (2.13) and
Note that Y (·) and Y ε (·) appeared on the right-hand sides are known. Setting τ = s in (2.14), we have
Regarding (2.6) (suppressing X(·) and u(·)) as a BSVIE with generator (s, r, y, z) → g(s, r, Y ε (r), z) (independent of y), we see that BSVIEs (2.15) and (2.6) are identical. Hence, by uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSVIEs, one has 
i.e., in the current case, Z ε (s, τ ) is independent of s and can be denoted by Z ε (τ ). Clearly, (y ε (·), z ε (·)) satisfies (pick s = t in (2.18)) the following BSDE on [t, T ]:
Comparing (2.21) with the following (taking s = t in (2.13))
making use of the fact that (see (2.9)) Y ε (r) = Y (r) for r ∈ [t + ε, T ], we see that the above BSDEs (2.21) and (2.22) are identical for τ ∈ [t + ε, T ]. Hence,
Namely, for τ ∈ [t + ε, T ], (y ε (τ ), z ε (τ )) is independent of ε > 0 and (y(t, τ ), z(t, τ )) is independent of t. Thus, both can be denoted by (y(τ ), z(τ )). Combining with (2.20) and (2.23), one has
Also, taking τ = t + ε in (2.21), we have (noting (2.23))
Also, for fixed t, from (2.13), one has the following:
We now have two BSDEs (2.25) and (2.26) on [t, t + ε] which have the same terminal value y(t + ε), and with different generators g(t, · , Y ε (·), z) and g(t, · , Y (·), z). Hence, by the stability estimate of BSDE and (2.7), we have
Consequently,
which proves the estimate (2.12). Finally, from (2.25) and (2.13), together with (2.24), for s
Hence, if ( Y (·), Z(·)) is the adapted solution of (2.11), then (2.10) holds.
Next, let us consider the following system of decoupled FSDEs and BSVIE:
For the maps b, σ, g, h in the above, we assume that the corresponding (H1)-(H2) (ignoring u(·)) hold, by Lemma 2.1, system (2.28) admits a unique adapted solution (X(·), Y (·), Z(· , ·)). Further, we have the following representation (whose proof can be found in [40] ).
is a classical solution to the following PDE:
For
As a convention here and below, for any differentiable function ϕ : R n → R the gradient ϕ x : R n → R 1×n is a row vector valued function. From the above, we see that when r → Θ x (s, r, x) is continuous, r → Z(s, r) is continuous. To conclude this section, let us recall a result for Problem (R). The corresponding HJB equation reads
with
The following result is a standard verification theorem of Problem (R). One is referred to Wei-Yong-Yu [43] for a proof of this result.
Proposition 2.5. Let (H1)-(H2) hold with g and h being of form (2.31) . Suppose that V R (·, ·) ∈ C 1,2 ([0, T ] × R n ; R) is a classical solution of the HJB equation (2.32) . Then for any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D,
Let (t, ξ) ∈ D be a given initial pair and (X(·),ū(·)) be the corresponding state-control pair such that
In another word, V R (· , ·) is the value function of Problem (R) and (X(·),ū(·)) is an optimal pair of Problem (R) for the initial pair (t, ξ).
Feedback Strategy and Equilibrium Strategy
Since Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, instead of looking for an optimal control, we should find a socalled time-consistent equilibrium strategy for it, which is time-consistent and is locally optimal in a suitable sense. Inspired by the method of multi-person differential games developed in [46] , we will introduce approximate equilibrium strategies associated with partitions of time intervals, together with their constructions, and investigate the limit as the mesh size of the partition tends to zero. To this end, let us first introduce the following definition.
and ξ ∈ X t , the following closed-loop system:
Under (H2), for a given feedback strategy Ψ(· , ·), the following BSVIE:
admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) ≡ (Y Ψ (·), Z Ψ (· , ·)). Therefore, the corresponding recursive cost functional at (t, ξ) is well-defined:
In this case, the outcome u(·) of Ψ(· , ·), called a closed-loop control, given by the following
where
then (Y Ψ (·), Z Ψ (· , ·)) admits the following representation:
T ], a.s., (3.5) with X Ψ (·) being the solution of (3.1).
Next, we introduce the following notion, which combines the time-consistency and the local optimality.
From (3.7), we see that the family {Ψ ε (· , ·)} ε>0 satisfies the following:
which can be referred to as the local near-optimality of the family {Ψ ε (· , ·)} ε>0 at (t, ξ) (see [51] for the notion of near-optimality, for standard time-consistent problems). Further, if the following holds
which can be referred to as the local near-optimality of Ψ(· , ·) itself (instead of the family {Ψ ε (· , ·)} ε>0 ).
To construct equilibrium strategies, we need to make some preparations. First, we set
The infimum (or minimum) of the map u → H(t, s, x, u, θ, p, P ) will be needed below. However, this map may not be bounded below in general; even if it is bounded below, the infimum might not be achieved; and even if the minimum exists (in the case, say, U is compact), the minimum might not be unique and might not have needed regularity properties. To avoid all these inconvenient situations which are not our main concern in this paper, similar to [46] , we introduce the following technical assumption, which, as mentioned in [46] , is satisfied by some situations.
(H3) There is a continuous map ψ :
with the properties that the map (t, s, x, θ, p, P ) → H t, s, x, ψ(t, s, x, θ, p, P ), θ, p, P is continuously differentiable having bounded derivatives in its arguments.
We admit that the above assumption is restrictive and maybe far more than enough. The problem without the above (H3) is widely open. We prefer not to explore the minimization problem in (H3) here, and leave it to our future investigations. Now, let 0 τ <τ < T and Ψ : [τ , T ] × R n → U be a feedback strategy on [τ , T ]. We want to extend Ψ(· , ·) to [τ, T ] × R n by means of optimal controls. To this end, we formulate a time-consistent optimal control problem on [τ,τ ]. For any t ∈ [τ,τ ], ξ ∈ X t , and u(·) ∈ U [t,τ ], we apply u(·) to the system on [t,τ ) followed by the feedback strategy Ψ(· , ·) on [τ , T ]. Then the state equation reads (recall (3.8))
where (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSVIE:
Note that for s ∈ [t,τ ], the state X(·) satisfies the following: 16) and the BSVIE (3.15) can be written as
(3.17)
It seems to be difficult to write the above (3.17) as a BSDE on [t,τ ] in general. In fact, even if the sum of the first three terms on the right-hand side is Fτ -measurable, due to the dependence on s of this sum and the integrand of the fourth term, one at most can get a BSVIE on [t,τ ]. Consequently, the optimal control problem associated with the state equation (3.16) and cost functional (3.14) (determined through (3.17)) is generally time-inconsistent, which could not be handled by the classical dynamic programming approach. Therefore, instead of (3.15), we introduce the following modified BSVIE: Then we define the recursive cost functional for (t, ξ) ∈ [τ,τ ] × X t as follows:
and pose the following optimal control problem.
The above is referred to as a sophisticated optimal control problem on [τ,τ ]. We have the following result concerning the above problem. Proposition 3.3. Let Θ Ψ (· , · , ·) be a classical solution to the following: 20) and let Θ Ψ (τ, · , ·) be a classical solution to the following: Let us make a comment on (3.20) and (3.21) . In the former, t is not fixed since in the equation, both Θ Ψ (t, s, x) and Θ Ψ (s, s, x) appear. Whereas, in the latter, τ only plays a role of parameter and it is fixed. Clearly, the former is much difficult than the latter, and their structures are essentially different.
From (2.12), we know that there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)) such that
is a standard optimal control problem with a recursive cost functional which is time-consistent, we may use dynamic programming method. Thus, the value function V τ (· , ·) of Problem (C Ψ [τ,τ ]) is the unique viscosity solution to the following HJB equation:
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11) . Further, under the non-degenerate condition, V τ (· , ·) is the unique classical solution to the above HJB equation. Then, we may define
This extends Ψ from [τ , T ] × R n to [τ, T ] × R n . For convenience, we refer to the above as the strategy extension procedure for Ψ(· , ·).
With the above preparation, we now proceed a construction of equilibrium strategies. Let τ ∈ [0, T ) be fixed and let Π ≡ {t k | 0 k N } be a partition of [τ, T ] with
whose mesh size Π is defined by Π max
For the given partition Π, denote
(3.33)
Following the idea of [46] , we now inductively construct a feedback strategy Ψ Π : [τ, T ] × R n → U associated with Π by means of optimal controls. For any t ∈ [t N −1 , T ], we first consider the following controlled SDE:
with the recursive cost functional J N (t, ξ; u N (·)) = Y N (t), (3.35) where (Y N (·), Z N (·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
(3.36)
The optimal control problem associated with the above state equation (3.34) and recursive cost functional (3.35)-(3.36) is time-consistent. By dynamic programming approach, under proper conditions, the value function, denoted by, V N (· , ·) is the classical solution to the following HJB equation:
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11) . Then define feedback strategy
is an optimal control of the corresponding optimal control problem.
Next, by the above strategy extension procedure, we obtain an extension Ψ N −1 : [t N −2 , T ] × R n → U of Ψ N (· , ·) by the following steps:
Step 1. Solve the following representation PDE parameterized by t ∈ [t N −1 , T ]:
and then solve the following PDE:
x ∈ R n .
(3.40)
Step 2. Solve the following HJB equation:
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11) , assuming that the classical solution V N −1 (· , ·) exists.
Step 3. Define
By verification theorem (Proposition 2.5), we know that the outcome
of the feedback strategy Ψ N −1 (· , ·) is the optimal control for the corresponding sophisticated optimal control problem on [t N −2 , t N −1 ]. Now, suppose Ψ k+1 (· , ·) has been constructed on [t k , T ] × R n , (for some k = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1). We apply the above strategy extension procedure to obtain an extension Ψ k : [t k−1 , T ]×R n → U of Ψ k+1 (· , ·) by the following steps:
Step 1. Solve the following representation PDE parameterized by t ∈ [t k , T ]: 43) and then solve the following PDE:
(3.44)
with the Hamiltonian H given by (3.11) , again, assuming the classical solution V k (· , ·) exists.
The same as above, the outcome
of the feedback strategy Ψ k (· , ·) is an optimal control of the corresponding sophisticated optimal control on [t k−1 , t k ].
This completes the induction.
It is seen that Ψ 0 : [τ, T ] × R n → U is a feedback strategy whose outcome u k (·) on [t k−1 , t k ] is optimal for the corresponding sophisticated problem on [t k−1 , t k ]. We call the above constructed Ψ 0 (·, ·) (which is determined by partition Π) an equilibrium strategy associated with Π. Our next goal is to obtain the limit as Π → 0.
To get the right ansatz, let us make an observation. Once Ψ k (s, x) is defined for (s, x) ∈ [t k−1 , T ]×R n , we may extend Θ k (t, s, x) and Θ k (s, x) as follows:
Now, for any given partition Π of [τ, T ], we define
Thus Θ Π (·, ·, ·) is well-defined. Then Θ Π (·, ·, ·) and Θ Π (·, ·, ·) satisfy the following PDEs: Note that 
We call (3.56) the equilibrium HJB equation of Problem (N), and V (·, ·) the equilibrium value function of Problem (N). The map Ψ(·, ·) defined by (3.62) is a feedback strategy of Problem (N) provided that (3.56) has a solution with good regularities. We will show that the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) in the next section. Note that the equilibrium HJB equation (3.56) can actually be written as follows: We see that (3.66)-(3.67) exhibits an interesting relationship between equilibrium HJB equation (3.63) and coupled FSDE and BSVIE (3.65). We will explore more about this in Section 5.
Verification Theorem and Well-Posedness of Equilibrium HJB Equation
For any partition Π, we have constructed an approximate equilibrium strategy Ψ Π (·, ·) of Problem (N).
Taking the limit lim Π →0
Ψ Π (·, ·), we have formally obtained the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·). In this section, we would like to show that Ψ(·, ·) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N) in the sense of Definition 3.2. Such a result can be viewed as a verification theorem for our constructed strategy Ψ(·, ·).
In order to show the local optimality of the feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·), we assume that the equilibrium HJB equation (3.63) admits a unique smooth solution. We also assume that all the involved functions are bounded and differentiable with bounded derivatives. For any fixed t ∈ [0, T ) and ε > 0 small with t + ε T , we consider Problem (C Ψ [t, t + ε]). Then by Proposition 3.3, the state equation and the cost functional of Problem (C Ψ [t, t + ε]) can be given by Note that Problem (C Ψ [t, t + ε]) is a classical recursive stochastic optimal control problem and thus is time consistent. Let Θ ε (t, ·, ·) be the unique classical solution of the following HJB equation:
By Proposition 2.5, the outcome u ε (·) = Ψ ε (·, X ε (·)) of strategy Ψ ε (·, ·) is an optimal control of Problem
J t (t, ξ; u(·)). 
(4.9)
Therefore, there are some gaps in the proofs of the verification theorem in [43, 28] . In fact, if (4.9) holds, by (4.4)-(4.7), we get
Then the following should hold true:
Combining the above with (4.9) yields that
(4.10)
Since the H-term of (4.7) depends on τ ; t τ t + ε, the above equality usually fails. Therefore, we do not have (4.9) in general.
By Proposition 2.2, we know that there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ξ, u(·)) such that J t (t, ξ; u(·)) − J(t, ξ; u ⊕ Ψ| [t+ε,T ] ) Kε 2 .
(4.11)
Combining the above with (4.6), we have
where o(ε) is uniform in u(·) ∈ U [t, t + ε]. Thus (Ψ ε ⊕ Ψ| [t+ε,T ] )(·, ·) satisfies the local near-optimality (3.9). Next, we would like to show that Ψ(·, ·) satisfies the local optimality condition (3.10) under the following assumption:
(H4) There exists a nondecreasing continuous function ρ :
where Θ(·, ·, ·) and Θ ε (·, ·, ·) are the classical solutions of the PDE (4.7) and (4.4), respectively. Under (H4), by the definitions of Ψ ε (·, ·) and Ψ(·, ·), we have Let (X(·), Y (·), Z(·)) ≡ (X Ψ (·), Y Ψ (·), Z Ψ (·)) and (X ε (·), Y ε (·), Z ε (·)) ≡ (X Ψ ε (·), Y Ψ ε (·), Z Ψ ε (·)) be the unique solutions to the controlled SDE (4.1) and BSDE (4.3) corresponding to the feedback strategies Ψ(·, ·) and Ψ ε (·, ·), respectively. By Lemma 2.1 and (4.13), we have
(4.14)
Then by Grönwall's inequality, there exists a constant K > 0, independent of (t, ε) such that
Combining the above with the standard estimate of SDEs, we have
In particular, E t |X ε (t + ε) − X(t + ε)| 2 Kερ(ε) 2 (1 + |ξ| 2 ). 
− g t, r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)), Y (r), Z(r) dr 2 .
Then by Hölder inequality and (4.13)-(4.16)-(4.18), we have
− g t, r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)), Y (r), Z(r) 2 dr Applying Itô formula to s → Θ(t, t + ε, X(s)) on [t, t + ε] implies that
t + ε, X(r))b r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) + 1 2 tr Θ xx (t, t + ε, X(r))σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) ⊤ dr + t+ε t Θ x (t, t + ε, X(r))σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) dW (r).
(4.20)
Similarly,
(4.21)
Thus, we get
t + ε, X(r)) ⊤ b r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) − Θ x (t, t + ε, X ε (r)) ⊤ b r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) + 1 2 tr Θ xx (t, t + ε, X(r))σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) ⊤ − 1 2 tr Θ xx (t, t + ε, X ε (r))σ r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) σ r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) ⊤ dr 2 KεE t t+ε t Θ x (t, t+ε, X(r)) ⊤ b r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) −Θ x (t, t+ε, X ε (r)) ⊤ b r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) + 1 2 tr Θ xx (t, t + ε, X(r))σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) σ r, X(r), Ψ(r, X(r)) ⊤ − 1 2 tr Θ xx (t, t + ε, X ε (r))σ r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) σ r, X ε (r), Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) ⊤ 2 dr KεE t t+ε t |Ψ ε (r, X ε (r)) − Ψ(r, X ε (r))| 2 + |X ε (r) − X(r)| 2 dr.
Then by (4.13) and (4.16), the above implies that
Substituting (4.22) into (4.19), we have
Combining the above with (4.6), we get
Then by Proposition 2.2, we have the following local near optimality of Ψ(·, ·):
(4.23)
In conclusion, we can state the following result formally.
Theorem 4.1. Feedback strategy Ψ(·, ·) defined by (3.62) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N).
Since Ψ(· , ·) is an equilibrium strategy of Problem (N), the corresponding closed-loop system (3.65) is called an equilibrium system. From the definition (3.12) of ψ(·), it is clear that the dependence of σ(·) on the control process u(·) leads to the appearance of Θ xx (s, s, x) in Ψ(s, x), which turns out to bring some essential difficulties in establishing the well-posedness of equilibrium HJB equation. At the moment, such a general situation is widely open and will be investigated in our future publications. In the subsequent analysis of this section, we will consider a special but still important case, in which σ(·) is independent of the control process u(·). More precisely, we assume that 
where a(·) is defined by (3.64 ). In the current case, the equilibrium strategy is given by
for which Θ xx (· , · , ·) does not appear.
For the well-posedness of (4.26), we make the following assumption. are bounded, have all required differentiability with bounded derivatives. Moreover, there exist two constants λ 0 , λ 1 > 0 such that
We have the following result whose proof can be found in [43, Theorem 6.1]. In the proof of Theorem 4.1, we introduce the assumption (H4) to get the local near optimality of the equilibrium strategy Ψ(·, ·). When σ(·) is independent of the control u(·) (see (4.24)), the arguments of Theorem 4.1 still hold true with Assumption (H4) replaced by the following assumption:
(H4) ′ There exists a nondecreasing continuous function ρ :
We shall show that the above assumption is a consequence of (H5). In fact, under (H5), it follows from Theorem 4.2 that Θ(·, t + ε, ·) is well-defined and belongs to C 1,2 ([t, t + ε] × R n ; R). Thus one can regard (4.7) as a new equilibrium HJB equation satisfying (H5) with h(·, ·) and [0, T ] replaced by Θ(·, t + ε, ·) and [t, t + ε], respectively. Moreover, we see that PDE (4.4) is the approximate equation of (4.7) with the partition Π : t = t 0 < t 1 = t + ε. Then by the last inequality in the proof of [43, Theorem 6.2], we have
for some constant K > 0, which implies that the assumption (H4) ′ holds. Therefore, under (H1), (H2), (H3) ′ , and (H5), Problem (N) admits an equilibrium strategy over [0, T ].
5 BSVIEs with Diagonal Values of Z(· , ·).
In this section, we look at a new type BSVIE resulted from the equilibrium solution to Problem (N). Let (H5) hold with d = n and (4.24) hold, namely, σ is independent of u. Thus, σ(s, x) is invertible. Let Θ(· , · , ·) be the classical solution to the equilibrium HJB equation (4.26) . Then Ψ(· , ·) defined by (4.27) is an equilibrium strategy. Substituting this Ψ(· , ·) into (3.65) leads to the following closed-loop system: Unlike the BSVIEs studied in the literature, the above BSVIE contains the diagonal valuesZ(r, r) of Z(· , ·). To our best knowledge, this is the first time that such a BSVIE appears. Our above results show that the above coupled FSDE and BSVIE admits an adapted solution (X(·),Ȳ (·),Z(· , ·)). Moreover, the representation (5.2)-(5.3) holds, with Θ(· , · , ·) being the classical solution to the equilibrium HJB equation (4.26). We point out that (5.2) and (5.4) , which represents the solution Θ(· , · , ·) to the equilibrium HJB equation (4.26) , is a kind of Feynman-Kac formula.
The above naturally motivates us to investigate the following more general coupled FSDE and BSVIE: The main feature is that the generator g of the above BSVIE contains the diagonal value Z(r, r). In the rest of this section, we will sketch some relevant results of the above coupled FSDE and BSVIE. More general detailed investigation of such BSVIEs will be carried out elsewhere.
Inspired by the results of previous sections, as well as the ideas from [24, 40] , we let (t, s, x) → Θ(t, s, x) be C 0,1,2 (∆[0, T ] × R n ). Applying Itô's formula to the process s → Θ(t, s, X(s)), one obtains Θ(t, T, X(T )) − Θ(t, t, X(t)) = Comparing (5.9) with the BSVIE in (5.8) , we see that the following should be the right choice:
Θ(t, T, X(T )) = h(t, X(T )), (5.10) Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Let the following system admit a classical solution Θ(· , · , ·): Then (Y (·), Z(· , ·)) defined by (5.11) is an adapted solution to the BSVIE in (5.8) .
When σ(s, x, θ) is independent of θ, Theorem 4.2 provides a sufficient condition for the well-posedness of (5.12). We now look at the uniqueness of the adapted solutions (5.8) . To this end, let us first introduce the following assumption.
(H6). Let d = n. There exist maps µ :
s, x, y, ζ, z) = ν(t, s)g 0 (s, x, y, ζ) + zα(s), Let us list some possible functions µ(·, ·) and ν(·, ·) satisfying (H6) as follows:
(i) Heterogeneous discounting: µ(t, T ) = e −λ1(T −t) , ν(t, r) = e −λ2(r−t) with λ 1 , λ 2 > 0, λ 1 = λ 2 . We can let M(t) = e −λ1t , M (t, s) = e (λ2−λ1)t − e (λ2−λ1)s , N (T ) = 0, K(r) = e −λ2r .
(ii) Convex combination of two exponential discounting : Proof. The existence of the adapted solution to (5.15 ) is a combination of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.1. We only need to prove the uniqueness here. Let (X i (·),Ȳ i (·),Z i (·, ·)); i = 1, 2 be two adapted solutions to (5.15) . By the uniqueness of BSVIE, there exist uniquely (y i (· , ·), z i (· , ·)); i = 1, 2 such that y i (t, s) = µ(t, T )h 0 (T,X i (T )) + For any t ′ ∈ [τ, T ), combining the above with (5.14) ,
Let ( Y i (·), Z i (·)); i = 1, 2 be the unique solution to the following BSDE:
respectively. Multiplying the both side of BSDE (5.19) 
For the fixed t, t ′ , by the uniqueness of the adapted solution to the above BSDE, we have
In particular, the following holds by taking t = s and t ′ = τ ,
Thus, ( X i (·), y i (τ, ·), Y i (·), z i (τ, ·), Z i (·)) satisfies the following coupled FBSDEs: By [24, Theorem 4.1], the above coupled FBSDEs admit a unique adapted solution. It follows that X 1 (·), y 1 (τ, ·), Y 1 (·), z 1 (τ, ·), Z 1 (·) = X 2 (·), y 2 (τ, ·), Y 2 (·), z 2 (τ, ·), Z 2 (·) .
Combining this with (5.20), we have By the definition (5.18) of ( X i (·), y i (·, ·), z i (·, ·)) and the relationship (5.17), we havē Then (Ȳ i (·),Z i (·, ·)) satisfies the following BSVIE:
Y i (t) = µ(t, T )h 0 (T,X(T )) + T t v(t, r)g 0 (r,X(r),Ȳ (r),Z(r, r)) +Z i (t, r)α(r) dr (r, r) ). By Lemma 2.1, we have (Ȳ 1 (·),Z 1 (·, ·)) = (Ȳ 2 (·),Z 2 (·, ·)).
Combining the above with (5.21), the uniqueness of the adapted solution to the coupled FSDE and BSVIE (5.15) is obtained.
Remark 5.3. Under (H5)-(H6), Theorem 5.2 establishes the well-posedness of the coupled SDE and BSVIE (5.15) , which is relevant to several important recursive optimal control problems with nonexponential discounting. The more general case (5.8) is still open. We hope to explore that in our future publications.
In this section, we are making some remarks to conclude this paper.
First of all, for recursive cost functional with nonexponential discounting, should one use parameterized BSDEs as in [46, 43] or use BSVIE as in the current paper? For a stochastic optimal control problem, a recursive cost functional, with exponential discounting, can be described by the adapted solution to a BSDE. When the discounting is nonexponential, and/or the running cost rate and the terminal cost are initial time dependent, then the recursive cost functional had better to use a BSVIE, instead of a parameterized BSDE (as in [46, 43] ). To be convincing, let us present a brief argument on that.
For any initial pair (t, ξ) ∈ D and control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], let X(·) be the corresponding state process. Motivated by the nonexponential discounting, one may consider the following cost functional as we have done in this paper. We know that under proper condition, the above BSVIE admits a unique adapted solution (Y (·), Z(·, ·)) and process Y (·) is the most natural candidate for the recursive cost functional with nonexponential discounting in the following sense: The current cost functional value J(t, ξ; u(·)) = Y (t) really depends on the cost functional values J(r, X(r); u(·)) = Y (r) for r ∈ [t, T ], through a BSIVE. Furthermore, such a recursive cost functional is time-consistent itself, in the following sense: The future value of the cost functional predicted/calculated today will match the value of the cost functional when that specific future time moment arrives. Some more detailed derivation and discussion can be found in [37] . In a word, when we consider the stochastic optimal control problems with recursive cost functional having generalized (nonexponential) discounting, BSVIE description should be a more proper choice than the parameterized BSDE. Now, let use make a direct comparison between the equilibrium HJB equations resulting from the approach of [43] and the one of this paper. For convenience, we only consider the case that σ is independent of control u. As in [43] , if the recursive cost functional is taken to be (6.5), then the equilibrium HJB Comparing the above with (4.26), we see that Θ(t, s, x) in the above is replaced by Θ(s, s, x) in (4.26). This is the main consequence of using BSVIE instead of parameterized BSDE. As we explained above, such a replacement makes the problem more natural. On the other hand, from the mathematical viewpoint, since Θ(s, s, x) has been appeared in ψ(·), regardless the above replacement, therefore, replacing Θ(t, s, x) by Θ(s, s, x) mathematically reduces the complexity of the equation.
Next, in the current paper, by using the idea inspired by multi-person differential games ( [46, 43] ) and representation of adapted solutions to BSVIEs ( [49, 40] ), we obtain the equilibrium strategy for Problem (N), which is time-consistent, locally near optimal, and it is determined by the solution to an equilibrium HJB equation. We have seen that the equilibrium HJB equation in this paper is an interesting modification of that found in [43] .
Further, as a byproduct, in obtaining a Feynman-Kac type formula for the equilibrium HJB equation, we introduce a new class of BSVIEs for which the diagonal value Z(s, s) of process Z(· , ·) appears. For such kind of equations, some very special cases have been studied and the general case is left widely open. Actually, our introduction in this paper initiates the research for such kind of BSVIEs. Some relevant ideas and results for the so-called extended BSVIEs can be found in [35] .
Finally, we provide a partial list of the widely open questions concerning our Problem (N):
• Solvability of general equilibrium HJB equation (3.63), with non-degenerate and bounded diffusion, i.e., λ 0 I σ(t, x, u)σ(t, x, u) ⊤ λ 1 I.
• When σ(t, x, u) is degenerate (and it is independent of u), is it possible to use viscosity solution to identify/characterize the equilibrium value function?
• If the map ψ defined by (3.12) is not regular enough, or not unique, or even does not exist, what one can do for Problem (N)?
